realm [rather than eliminate it as Ab later (and prob. misguidedly) says anarchists want to do], without centralizing power, without strengthening the bureaucracy, without using representative techniques xii the goal is to help the political animal flourish, to create a space of active engagement and equality xiii reduction is a key term: the State must be reduced, that is, it must be understood for what it is, an objectification of people's activity [essentially: constituted power is seen as really just a form of constituent power] xiii the State is reduced to merely one [contingent] form of relation among people [rather than the sovereign relation among people] xiii it is one of millions of relations, and it is absorbed into that sea xiii true democracy requires the reduction of the State, so that we see the State as partial, and instituting/constituting power as universal xiii for Ab, M felt that true democracy would bring out the baseline conflict between plebs and nobles, between governing classes and the governed xiv for Ab the idea of democracy is to break with the idea of the political organizing form, i.e. to not want or expect the establishment of a new, "democratic" organizing form xiv true democracy keeps the ruling classes' rule from being settled [very JR] xv it rejects the entire device of sovereignty and the idea of rulers/ruled as a natural, necessary relation xv it rejects a completed whole xv the communal constitution is a big deal for M [and Ab?] , perhaps a way forward to establishing a political realm in a non-sovereign, non-State way xv a constitution whose mission is to struggle against the State; a political form that struggles against political form xvi a la Clastres [and Graeber] : mechanisms whose purpose is to ward off Cephalus, to ward off the separated power of the State-form, to block a division between State and society [by reducing the State, forcing it to swim in the sea as one water molecule among millions] xvi not a millenarian disappearance of the State; but a perpetual struggle against the State, to reduce the State xvi M 1871: the State machine is not to be seized and used, but smashed xvii the State is not a neutral mechanism, bad only because the bourgeoisie controls it; it is itself a form of domination, itself to be struggled against xvii social domination is the State's embryonic structure; it separates power from society xvii for M the Commune was a revolution against the State itself; and for the people's desire to govern themselves xviii "by taking the direction of public affairs into their own hands" xix democracy does not resolve social division into a singular demos [although 2of20 this is at times what it seems in M, per Ab], rather democratic society continuously self-institutes, and the division is a necessary element in this process xviii the Communal form/constitution was a form whose purpose was to forestall the State's return, to nurture the desire for liberty xix a form designed to ward off both the return of the old State, and the emergence of the State that is being born xix democracy is not one possible form of the good regime, it is the rejection of the idea that a good regime is possible xix the Commune is not a final/perfect/determinant form of democracy, it is an example xx M: the Commune was not the establishing of democracy, but the embodiment of the movement toward democracy xx it made self-determination actual, currently practiced, active xxi a political form whose purpose is to always search actively for its own political expression; a political form of emancipation xxi against Jacobinism, against appropriating the State as a strategy xxi also "the anarchist rejection of the political realm" is rejected; Ab and M want not just "spontaneous sociality," but to regenerate an active political life of self-governance [this way of understanding anarchism is unhelpful, I think] xxi Ab: 'democratic State' is an oxymoron xxi goal is to act politically such that we annihilate the division between rulers and ruled xxi Ab: Lefort's "savage" democracy, in the sense of wildcat strikes that can endure without a bureaucracy, without a division between power and people (Budapest 1956 , Paris 1968 , Gdansk 1980 -2, Paris 1995 Marx's 1843 Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the question of "real democracy," which, for M would mean "the disappearance of the political state" xxx in the 1871 addresses on the Commune, this is less a withering of the State than a struggle against it xxxi democracy works against domination, for free action xxxi for M democracy is the "resolved enigma of all constitutions" xxxi all constitutions are alienations from the power that produced them, which is the demos and its free action xxxi we might settle on Lefort's savage democracy, resolved by the principle of anarchy [see appendix] xxxi emancipation from foundational principles, a politics exposed to flux, and to the possible xxxii for Lefort there is a role for the struggle for rights, for new law, but not as they are typically understood xxxii it is essential to ward off State control xxxii democracy is a struggle that rises against the State xxxiii it reduces the State to one moment among many of the people's power, we should read the political writings as a work of thought 3 an occulted dimension of M: a philosophical questioning of the political realm, which runs through his whole work [Ab is essentially positing a "minor political Marx" to discover] 3 this dimension is best revealed through Machiavelli 3 read M (and Machiavelli) as though they were living today and see what they have to offer 4 Machiavelli offers a proper thinking of the political, not as reduced to an epiphenomenon 5
Pocock, using Machiavelli, upends the juridico-political model of political philosophy and offers instead a (Machiavellian) republican and humanist model that affirms the active-political nature of humans 6 so the Machiavellian moment: take up the goal of an active political life using logos to make common decisions in the polis 6-7 here truth is generated by citizens in common through logos 7 homo politicus/homo rhetor/zoon politikon 7 republic is the best form of polis 7 the polis is not subject to eternal fact, it makes its own way, values, norms, laws, justice 7 in 1842 Marx welcomed this Machiavellian centering of the political/human/earthly against the theological-political of his Germany 8 M loved A's idea of the political animal 8 is true democracy = civic-republican humanism? 8 7of20 II: there are two constellations in the young Marx: 1842 and then 1843-4, the second a critique of the first 9 first: emancipate the political from the theological 9 second: question the political realm as it is identified with the modern State 9-10 later there was the turn to political economy and a denying the autonomy of the political (and a severing from Machiavelli) 10 but Ab thinks M's questioning of the political never went away 11 [his method of sussing out something he already wants to be there seems a bit shaky] was there a break after which he abandoned the political to epiphenomenon? Or was he just finding in the proletariat a new political subject, alternative to Hegel's State? 11 the question of democracy, the political realm, emancipation, life in common in the polis: these are the themes Ab finds in Marx, and says they are enduring (not just in the young M) 12 upshot: 1843 is not just a superseded youthful indiscretion...it is part of a serious search for democracy and the political realm that never ceased 12-13 all political forms 48-9 i.e. democracy is the truth of monarchy, and of every constitution 49 we must discover how we might live together in a way that enables liberty 50 Moses Hess: all politics involves the opposition between domination and submission 50 so monarchy is the truth of politics 50 anarchy, for Hess, is the negation of domination, of the State, of politics 50 he also rejects democracy [meaning liberal democracy, I think] 50-1 M: for Spinoza democracy is the crown of political forms, the most natural form, most rational, most free 51 the true political form 51 politics and the political realm, for M (contra Hess), is not limited to the master/slave relation, it involves also the working out the union of humans oriented toward liberty 51 Hess has only a negative relation to politics, M has a critical relation, trying to distinguish true from false politics 52 II: the activity of the whole demos is objectified in the constitution 53 but in democracy, the constitution and its objectification are reduced, they are seen as a subordinated tool, a convenience meant to serve humans, not as a power lifted over them to rule them 53 democracy is human existence, whereas other forms are merely political existence 53 but the constitution is still there in democracy, law is still there [the State too?], it is just deconsecreated, subordinated to the activity of the demos 53 socialized man is the essence of every constitution 53 M is not against the political realm, society against the State, but for a revolution in the political realm: democracy against the State 54 it is in democracy that man is his species-being [rather than in free economic production], and attains his objectification in and through the State [?] 54 he must realize a different political realm in order to attain his telos, his social being 54 you have to have civitas to have societas 50 giving himself the constitution enables the existence of socialized man [rather than man becoming socialized man in the social/economic realm and rendering the political realm unnecessary] 54 enables him to be freed from civil society 54 it is through the transubstantiation from the private/civil society into the public/State that the movement toward man's species-being is contained, toward socialized man 55-6 but it is necessary to remain vigilant, to prevent constitutional objectification from degenerating into alienation 56 democracy does this by reducing the constitution to its source, which is the activity of the demos, and thus the constitution does not become crystallized, removed, and alienated from that activity 56 democracy thinks of the constitution not as a sacred text, as prepolitical given, but as one among many, many moments/manifestations of the people's life and activity 56 this reduction, this going back to [se rabat sur, as Deleuze and Guattari would say in AO] the originary activity of the people, is the difference between democracy and other forms of constitution 56 and this reduction (for Ab) allows democracy to remain within itself, but so then, because of this reduction, it can spread into (irrigate) other non-political realms [this reduction-so-it-canspread riff is the weakest link in his argument] 56 without the reduction, the political (State) takes on an exorbitant, sovereign status 57 in monarchy the constitution is not reduced, and the people, the creator of the constitution, becomes understood instead as created by the constitution 57 in democracy the people are a subject that is its own end and that constitutes itself continually 58 the people are not constituted in the social realm, they are constituted in the political realm, by their political will to be a people 58 and they are perpetually conscious of themselves as the author of their own actions, as the creator/source of the constitution 58 III: democracy must be an ongoing self-determination, self-foundation 58 the constitution must be perpetually returned to the real ground of the demos, which prevents the slip from objectification into alienation 59 [never allowing State/law/constitution to ascend from earth into heaven] the demos always retains its right to give itself a new constitution; always recognizes itself as the foundational subject of politics, as the source of political power 59 the subject-people objectifies itself, and never ceases objectifying itself; never ceases reducing the constitution/State/law to merely one moment (among many) of the people's existence: the constitution is never confused with the people themselves or with the whole polis 60 the constitution is always material, empirical, historical, becoming; it is never an Idea, eternal, being 61 IV: in democracy, the whole is never represented by a part; the political State is never seen as identical to the demos 63 when a part claims to be the whole, it will be reduced, perceived as in fact a part [no one can say l'etat, c'est moi and get away with it] 63 13of20 [the concept of "reduction" is also, for Ab, a way to avoid arguing for the disappearance of the political State: since he allows it to exist, he has to have a way to ensure that it remains partial, ordinary, subordinated. It is unclear if such a thing should be called a "state" any more...it is certainly no longer a "State"] democracy itself remains reduced as well, never an organizing form for all realms of life, always merely a political moment, never the whole of the human realm 64 and yet [weak move] its very reduction allows it to "irrigate" other realms 64 again, for any institution [and these exist in democracy, for Ab], the key is to preserve the instituting activity, rather than allow it to dissipate and be substituted for by a dead, instituted structure 65 when this activity remains alive and fluid, it can irrigate other realms 65 [institutions must be perpetually vivified and deconsecrated] so in Ab's democracy the political State does not disappear entirely, it disappears as a totalizing organizing form and separate realm 65, 69 but, Ab keeps stressing, this does not mean the disappearance of the political realm more broadly [since the State is now properly seen as just one small part of the possible activity in the political realm] 66-7 it opens up the political realm to far more politics 67 democracy is thus, Ab claims, not anarchism, not the crude idea of the disappearance of the State, not the idea that the self-organization of the social realm makes the State and the political realm unnecessary 69 [Ab never tires of repeating the Aristotelian/Machiavellian insistence on the political as necessary for human flourishing] the political realm is the realm where people come to realize their species-being 70 make a free life in common 71 the political is not dissolved into the social, nor vice-versa: each realm remains its own moment 71 M preserves the political, but at the same time he restrains it, makes sure it does not grow into an organizing form [that would dominate/overshadow, say, economic production in the social realm] 71 in M democracy produces unity, but not by imposing a unifying form on the divisions of society 66 it can "produce an effectively actual universality" through constant action rather than a formal universality devoid of action 68 it can infuse all realms with the newly active life of the people 69 unity [or maybe better togetherness, commonality] can be generalized into non-political realms 71 but unity/institution must be continually vivified through the people's action [if it is not lived, if it is not effectively actual right now 14of20 because it is currently being lived by the people, then it does not exist] 71
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Moses Hess is cast as the figure of anarchy beyond the political realm, for M to reject 73 M: in true democracy the State is no longer an organizing form, but it still exists and there is still a political realm 73 democracy is limited, though, to its proper political realm 73 but also it initiates the coming of our species-existence 73 the political realm is different from other realms, M does not collapse everything into an organic whole 74 at the same time, unity plays a big role for M, he does not handle well the question of social division in the demos 74 Machiavelli is of use here: originary division between grandees' desire to command and the ruled's desire for liberty 74 and this division is the wellspring of liberty, for Machiavelli 75 both Machiavelli and Montesquieu question the figure of the One 75 M does not: he sees unity as only positive 75 M: the truth of democracy means the disappearance of conflict (even if that does not mean an organic unity, for M) 75 the demos' unity can only exist if they are perpetually willing to be unified 75 when the whole demos becomes self-conscious, actually becomes the effective unitary subject, that is the center of true democracy for M 76 for M in true democracy the people objectify themselves as the whole demos but block the transformation of this objectification into alienation 76 Ab favors seeing the people as having a problematic and never completed identity, so as to prevent authoritarian ideas of the One, and allow for division and politics 77 M does oppose democracy and the political State 78 M brings democracy back to the self-organizing activity of the people 79 in the "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," the 1844-periodical published article, M installs the proletariat as the new actor, as universal class 79 this does not mean he leaves the demos and the Machiavellian moment, but it does portend a long period of attention to the social (rather than political) realm as the key to all things 79 in this new period, for M, instead of logos and the political as our nature, it is faber and the economic 82 his attention shifts: whole demos proletariat; democracy communism → → 82 but, Ab strains to say, the idea that after 1844 M abandons the Machiavellian 15of20 moment is wrong 83 [for me this straining is not needed. Why rescue Marx as someone who always thought the political. Maybe he mostly stopped caring about it. But there is still the Critique of Hegel, there is still the Commune addresses; the political analysis is there, why quibble over whether a later (major) Marx thought the political was epiphenomenon. Minor Marx didn't think that, so engage with minor Marx and leave major Marx alone...]
Ab's evidence is: an 1845 outline for a work on politics, and his subsequent writings on France and the commune 83 though Ab does admit that M became oriented primarily toward the economic rather than political intelligence 83 but did true democracy become sublimated to communism? 84 no, it persisted as latent in M's thinking, and the commune brought it out; the "political form at last discovered of the working class' social emancipation" 84 the commune did not seize the State, it smashed it, and M applauds this loudly [which for Ab shows the persistence of 1843] 84 the people re-appropriated control of their social life, control the State (of the French Revolution) had appropriated 85 the commune was the absolute contradiction of the State; it did not take over existing modern State power (which is as such a relation of domination), it transformed it, subordinated it 86 the State apparatus is not: neutral and dependent on who controls it, rather it is, all by itself, a relation of domination that batters down on society as a whole 86 the commune tried to destroy that relation of domination itself 86 Jacobinism, as a revolution via the State, misses this wisdom, and is rejected by M and Ab 86 the workers' revolution is not initially or immediately social: it begins in the political realm, and social emancipation must proceed through the political realm, through "the communal constitution" which deploys itself against State power in a permanent insurrection 87 this constitution is a self-institution of the demos that prevents the impudence of the State form from reclaiming its sovereignty 87 through such techniques as extended suffrage, recallability, and the like 87 a political form against formalism 88
Conclusion
Totalitarianism destroys politics, so we must remain political to ward it off 89 retain the emphasis on the originary social division 90 Machiavelli, Lefort 90 action in the public realm (Arendt) 90 M points to a living power that reminds us that emancipation involves flights, but it also involves struggle against the State 91 16of20 the catastrophe of actually existing socialism has made it clear for us now that liberty must be the primary question, the question of emancipation; also justice, the free city 91 M is valuable because he: we must remain opposed to the "form that takes itself for the whole of right" 98 we must always pursue a political life in common as citizens [never only an economic life in common as producers] 98
and in that political life we must invent new political links 99 we want conflict and struggle, not consensus; we must remember the category of plebs, and of grandees 100 we need a renewal of libertarian thought 100 but in tandem with law, with a new idea of law, and in tandem with power, with a new idea of power 100 and we should take seriously the idea of anarchy, the idea of democracy severed from all arche, all principle, all beginning/foundation assumptions 101 democracy refuses all order, all synthesis, all unity 101 action can go toward wherever end, there is no predetermined end 117 the political is neither a making concrete of an arche, nor a tinkering toward a telos; rather it is whatever we make of it 117 and what we make of it is never final: we will always struggle and contest and reinvent 117 being is continually becoming; the given is continually questioned 118 Lefort works with human rights, but these are constantly being reinvented, which means so is the idea of what humanity is 118 "Lefort posits the originary division of the social that is always already there" [why is this not an arche?] 118 the people are never identical with themselves: they are either above themselves, heroically shaking off chains, or below themselves, in servitude [and therefore true democracy is never a settled (or final) state of being] 119 all claims of a popular subject identical to itself are mystifications 119 19of20 democracy recognizes the impossibility of the closure, of the One of the people, and it proliferates links, centers, combinations among people 119 democracy is savage in the sense that it is not tamed, that it acts beyond the bounds of containers/limits that try to capture it 120 it is an instituting form that avoids being tamed/domesticated 120 democracy involves a coming together with others, a common, but not one that is unitary, that lacks division [it must be a together-indifference] 121 democracy dismisses the idea of solution, of regime, of instituted force; and favors the act of instituting, the leaving unresolved 121 what about law? 121 it is possible to imagine laws that favor liberty, laws that take off from the desire of the multitude to be free 122 law is then merely the political relation we have worked out most recently (and is never seen as given from an arche); it is just the current state of affairs, the current way we understand things, the thing we are here to decide whether or not to keep doing 122 paradox: democracy is the form of political experience against political form, it gives itself political institutions in order to struggle against institutions, it creates a state that rises against the State 123 democracy does not negate the political realm, but incessantly reinvigorates it 123 it never lets the Statist order integrate the plebs and their savage demands 123 but it also links up these demands, it connects savages in their liberty [we could says nomads here and be spot on] 123 democracy does away with beginnings and ends in order to free up the political, in order that we can become more political, pace those anarchists who argue we must avoid the political as arena of domination 124 20of20
